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Introduction
 
In September 2000 a court in the Dutch town Groningen sentenced the author K.
to six years’ imprisonment for the manslaughter of his wife. He buried her body in
the garden, where it was found nine years later. In the verdict the court shared the
conclusion of a well-known institute of psychiatric research and treatment that at
the time of the manslaughter K. was somewhat ‘
 
less
 
 accountable’. According to the
institute, K. suffered a personality disorder due to ‘unstable conditions of upbring-
ing’. And when, nine years ago, his wife summoned him to leave the house during
a fight, separation anxiety and old feelings of anger towards his mother lead to a
‘breakthrough of aggression’. Again, the court adopted this conclusion. In the same
year a Court of Appeal sentenced a 57-year-old father, who was accused by his
daughter of mental abuse with grave consequences, to six months’ probation. The
court stated that ‘simple abuse’ and ‘intentional disadvantaging’ of the daughter’s
health was proven. According to the daughter, because of the psychological terror
that lasted years on end she suffered from grave psychosomatic complaints, an
anxiety disorder, agoraphobia, and a personality disorder. The court concluded that
a relationship between the humiliations of the father and the complaints of the
daughter has been demonstrated. Though the court indeed admitted that there
probably is not a direct causal relationship, the health problems can ‘reasonably’
be attributed to the behaviour of the father.
The tenor of both verdicts is that the current behaviour and symptoms of both
the defendant and the plaintiff are seen as related to a traumatic upbringing or a
heartless parenting. Moreover, in the first-mentioned case, because of this relation-
ship the defendant was considered less accountable. When we are informed that a
serial rapist who is on trial has himself been severely sexually abused in his child-
hood, we sometimes feel an almost irrepressible tendency to somehow take into
account this latter fact. It is as if beyond this despicable adult the picture of a once
innocent young child starts to emerge. Sometimes this unfortunate childhood is
considered to be an extenuating circumstance by the judge (or the jury) and
sometimes we indeed intuitively concur with this judgement. But is this response
appropriate or right? Is this offender less accountable for his misdeeds, and if so,
how can this claim be justified? To what extent, if this is the case at all, can adults
be excused for their deeds on the basis of what they have experienced in their
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formative years? Is an extremely traumatic childhood, just like being psychotic,
mentally handicapped or being excessively compulsive, an excusing condition?
Lately in legal theory there is a lively discussion on excuses, in particular on
the so-called ‘abuse excuse’. Do excuses like drug or alcohol addiction, battered
woman syndrome, pre-menstrual stress or posttraumatic syndrome, black rage or
pornography defence exculpate suspects from their responsibility and consequently
threaten our legal system (Wilson, 1997)? In our contribution we will not examine
the similarities and differences between all the sorts of excuses, but concentrate
on a traumatic childhood. A distinguishing feature of child abuse is that the subjects
are children and it is often assumed that being severely mistreated during the most
formative years will hamper the development of the moral and emotional disposi-
tions. In this contribution the term ‘extreme or traumatic childhood’ in any case
refers to flagrant neglect and chronic rejection, sexual abuse, biting humiliations,
and cruel physical violence. Is this type of excuse similar to or different from the
generally accepted excuses like self-defence, ignorance or coercion? We think that
with regard to this specific excuse no general conclusions can be drawn. Stocker’s
(1999, p. 180) warning that sound reasons for accepting a particular abuse excuse
raised by a person facing a specific charge need not be sound reasons for accepting
a similar excuse in other circumstances, surely should be taken to heart. In the
following we concentrate on two paradigm cases of traumatic childhood, one of
which has often been the subject of normative–ethical discussions.
The notorious case of Robert Harris, who was executed in April 1992 at the
age of 39, is often used in (moral-) philosophical investigations into the limits of
moral responsibility (Watson, 1987; Wolf, 1987; Fischer & Ravizza, 1993). Harris,
who had endured a nightmare-like childhood, who was stabbed and beaten by his
alcoholic stepfather—at age 1 his jaw was broken—and rejected by his alcoholic
mother, in cold blood killed two teenagers because he needed their car for a bank
robbery. Harris took pleasure in shooting the two boys and afterwards even con-
sumed their lunches. Because of his mean demeanour he was even disliked by the
other inmates of Death Row. It is striking, however, that his sister remembered him
as a young child that loved animals and craved for attention:
I still remember the little boy who used to beg for love, for just one pat
or word of kindness … (Watson, 1987, p. 273)
More recently, the 15-year-old La’Tasha Armstead initially was sentenced to life
imprisonment for slicing the throat of the nurse who looked after her ailing grand-
mother. Later, another judge ruled that she would be eligible for parole in fifteen
years. She had a caring relationship with her grandmother and knew the nurse
quite well. But she and a friend desperately wanted the latter’s car and in the
process of hijacking the car she killed the nurse. At the time of her horrendous
action La’Tasha Armstead was only 11 years of age and already had been raped
several times and had at least one miscarriage. Her mother was a drug-addict and
her father was in prison for killing one of her ten half-siblings. At the age of 13 she
was pregnant again and her son was born in juvenile detention (
 
Los Angeles Times
 
,
 Is a Traumatic Childhood Just Another Abuse Excuse?
 
443
 
© 2003 Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia
 
6 August 1999). Here a minor who has endured a broken family, deep emotional
neglect, poverty, and all sorts of violence becomes a victimiser herself.
Are both persons fully responsible for their criminal deeds and to what extent
did their traumatic childhood make them less morally accountable for their crimes?
Are they both fully to blame for their actions or must we conceive them as persons
who developed into ‘morally insane persons’, whose responsibility is diminished? And
what kind of moral deficiencies or defects are assumedly associated or correlated
with the traumatic childhood experiences?
 
Moral Responsibility
 
In moral philosophy and moral psychology considerable attention has been given
to the phenomenon of child(hood) abuse and its consequences regarding moral
responsibility. Often these reflections hook on to Strawson’s seminal views on
responsibility (Strawson, 1982). The commonplace Strawson wants to depart from
is the great importance we attach to other persons’ attitudes and intentions towards
us as well as to the great extent to which our personal feelings and reactions
depend upon our beliefs about these attitudes and intentions. It does indeed matter
to us whether the actions of others, and in particular of significant others, reflect
attitudes towards us of goodwill, affection, or esteem on the one hand, or con-
tempt, indifference, or malevolence on the other. Strawson is especially interested
in the particular conditions under which, what he calls, the (negative and positive)
 
reactive attitudes
 
 do or do not seem reasonable or appropriate, and also what it
would be like not to endure them (p. 63). When one is offended or injured by
another person it is quite natural to feel resentment. However, there can be special
considerations that modify or remove this feeling.
The first group of special considerations—often called excusing conditions
(Watson, 1987)—indicate that the agent did not intentionally cause the harm; he
‘didn’t mean to’ or ‘was ignorant’. What all these excuses have in common is that
we continue to see the agent as a fully responsible agent. This is not the case with
the second group of special considerations—usually called exempting conditions—
more in particular with a second sub-group. This latter group comprises pleas like
‘she is chronically depressed’, ‘she is severely obsessive compulsive’, or ‘she is only
a very young child’. In this context insanity, mental illness, extreme youth or
psychopathy are also mentioned (Wallace, 1994). These pleas invite us to suspend
our ordinary reactive attitudes towards the agent, either temporarily or perma-
nently. The agent is seen as psychologically abnormal or morally underdeveloped.
We are forced to suspend our negative reactive attitudes and to adopt an objective
attitude; that is, to see the other as an object of treatment, as someone who should
be treated with special care, trained or cured. Though we can still care for and love
the other, she is not the subject of the full range of reactive attitudes and feelings,
like resentment, gratitude and anger (any more). Of course, the transition from the
reactive to the objective attitude is a gradual one, but when the attitude is almost
wholly objective, you may fight the other person but not quarrel with her, you can
talk to or negotiate with her but you cannot reason with her (Strawson, 1982, p. 66).
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According to Strawson, holding a person morally responsible or accountable is
just being an object of (positive or negative) reactive attitudes and emotions.
Regarding the second (sub-)group of special considerations, Strawson argues that
seeing someone 
as warped or deranged or compulsive in behaviour or particularly
unfortunate in his formative circumstances—seeing someone so tends, at
least to some extent, to set him apart from normal participant reactive
attitudes on the part of one who sees him, tends to promote, at least in
the civilised, objective attitudes. (p. 66)
It is striking that an ‘unfortunate childhood’ straight out is assumed to be an
exempting condition; that is, a valid abuse excuse, be it to some extent and only
for the civilised.
Watson (1987) also takes up the issue of childhood abuse and introduces the
infamous Harris case. Many of the exempting conditions, he points out, imply
explanations of why the agent displays the deviant qualities and is therefore
exempted from moral demands. It matters for our reactions to Robert Harris how
he became the man he is/was. How unfortunate was he in his formative years?
Despite Harris’s horrendous childhood, Watson rightly concludes that the bio-
graphical information does not bring him to the belief in the inevitability of the
upshot. Instead of ‘It had to be’ the thought is 
 
‘No wonder’
 
. Despite their horren-
dous and inhuman deeds, we cannot bring ourselves to totally reserve our reactive
attitudes towards Harris and La’Tasha Armstead. But we understand that they are
also victims and our heart goes out to the young boy and girl they once were. Our
reactions and feelings are ambivalent: as children they were victims but as adults
they are victimisers. Watson sensitively observes that, unless one knew Harris as a
child or keeps his earlier self vividly in mind, sympathy can hardly find a purchase.
 
Justifying the Claim
 
In our view, trying to answer the question ‘is an extreme childhood an exempting
condition?’ presupposes a specific conception of moral responsibility, viz. respon-
sibility as a historical notion. In a structural and seemingly nonhistorical notion of
moral responsibility, an agent who identifies wholeheartedly with his will should be
held responsible for his actions, irrespective of the history of his identifications.
Fischer & Ravizza (2000) characterise this approach as a ‘time-slice approach to
moral responsibility’. According to this view, it is the sort of character a person has
that is relevant to assessing his moral responsibility for action, not how he came to
have that character. It can be argued, however, that there are processes or mecha-
nisms like brainwashing, hypnosis and direct stimulation of the brain that can cause
acts for which the agent cannot be held responsible. Consequently, Fischer &
Ravizza conclude that certain histories, particularly understanding how mental
capacities came about or are blocked, do indeed matter. For them the past is
‘epistemically helpful’ and, therefore, an individual’s childhood or past experience
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can only be useful to responsibility ascription if the past is found to have left some
trace or shadow on the present. Regarding our question, these ‘traces’ can be
understood as the lack of specific moral capacities or qualities. Let us now return
to our main question.
Given this conception of responsibility, we will defend that our main question,
‘is an extreme youth or childhood abuse an exempting condition?’, can only be
answered affirmatively if in any case the following claims are plausible:
a) the agent, who was abused as a child, misses one or more of the mental qualities
that are separately necessary and together sufficient to holding her fully account-
able, and
b) the fact that the agent indeed misses one or more of these qualities, must be
related to or result from extreme childhood deprivation.
The plausibility of both claims, however, does not yet seem sufficient for rightfully
claiming that an extremely traumatic upbringing is an exempting condition. Think,
for example, of a person who misses certain mental qualities to which claim (a)
refers, but who could without much effort have acquired those missing qualities by
some self-cultivation or by seeing a counsellor quite some time before she commit-
ted the crime. Are we still allowed then to claim that her extreme youth is an
exempting condition? On the one hand, one may be inclined to answer this ques-
tion affirmatively, for in line with claim (a) it can be defended that an agent is 
 
fully
 
accountable only if at the moment of the lapse she is in full possession of a certain
configuration of mental qualities. If the historical conception of responsibility is
taken seriously, however, the question must be answered in the negative. For if it
is indeed the case that the agent still had the capacity and the opportunity to
acquire the missing mental qualities, then this person, herself, can be blamed for
missing these qualities and in any case can be held 
 
partially 
 
accountable for the
committed crimes. Therefore, in our view the plausibility of a third claim must also
be demonstrated, viz. 
c) the agent was unable, either by self-cultivation or with the help of available
others, still to acquire the missing mental qualities.
The justification of claim (a) in fact comprises two elements. First, a normative–
ethical view must be defended that indicates which mental qualities a person must
possess to hold her fully accountable. Next, on the basis of this view and with the
help of empirical findings it must be made plausible that this person indeed misses
one or more of these qualities. Regarding the first element, R. Jay Wallace (1994)
developed an interesting theory. In a philosophical, more specifically Kantian, jus-
tification, Wallace explains in detail that it is only fair to demand of a person to
comply with particular obligations if the obligations are supported by distinctively
moral reasons (p. 157). According to him, this idea of fairness implies that a person
can only be held accountable for not observing the obligations if she possesses the
power of reflective self-control. This power comprises both the capacity to grasp
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and apply moral reasons and the capacity to control or regulate her behaviour in
the light of these reasons. Both capacities are very sophisticated indeed and are
composed of different mental qualities. Next to the basic capacity to grasp the
moral concepts and values involved in moral justifications, in addition the first-
mentioned capacity comprises a well-developed capacity for moral judgement
too, including certain sensitivity for morally relevant aspects of the situation. The
second capacity involves both the capacity for critical self-reflection, that is, to step
back from and to assess one’s desires and inclinations, and the capacity to control
them whenever deemed appropriate or necessary. These capacities, Wallace keeps
stressing, are not an all-or-nothing affair; different levels of development can be
discerned.
The question arises, however, whether this illuminating philosophical view has
indeed indicated all the mental qualities a person must have acquired to be con-
ceived as fully accountable. The judgement that Robert Harris and La’Tasha
Armstead are less accountable because of their horrendous youth basically can
be justified not by referring to their lack of cognitive capacities or the power to
control themselves, but rather by referring to their underdeveloped moral–affective
qualities, in particular their incapacity to empathise and sympathise. In this respect
we take them to diverge from those young offenders who are mentally retarded
(IQ < 70). Surely both offenders are quite aware that certain practices promote or
are harmful to human welfare, and in this sense they are not totally ignorant of
certain facts of human wellbeing (Elliott, 1992). Both are capable of experiencing
physical pain themselves and, unlike animals, both indeed understand, at least
partially, what hurting or killing another person is. In carefully planning their
heinous crimes and in wilfully bringing about death or administering pain they,
unlike a fully psychotic person, made themselves causal agents in harming others.
Moreover, because of their careful planning, their crimes can hardly be explained
by uncontrollable impulses. In other words, next to the mental capacities that
Wallace mentions, in particular the capacity of moral reasoning and the power of
self-control, an elementary capacity to experience feelings of sympathy is also
required to hold a person who violates his moral responsibilities fully accountable
(Hoffman, 2000). 
Regarding claim (b), the question arises, which demands must be made on the
evidence that there is indeed a relationship between an extreme childhood and
the lack of the qualities that are required for being fully accountable? Must we have
at our disposal empirically corroborated causal explanations? And is this a realistic
and thus a justified requirement? What type of research is needed here and indeed
feasible? Surely behavioural researchers will not and cannot subject young children
to experimental conditions that together form an operationalisation of an extremely
harsh and brutal upbringing and in due time compare their (im)moral behaviour and
attitudes with those of children brought up in ‘normal’ circumstances. Moreover,
nowadays the idea that specific childhood experiences in themselves have long-term
effects is rejected in favour of the assumption of much more complicated, multi-
causal processes. This issue requires longitudinal studies that comprise various
parameters:
 Is a Traumatic Childhood Just Another Abuse Excuse?
 
447
 
© 2003 Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia
 
Until prospective studies have followed individuals—whose premorbid
personality and environmental characteristics are known—over sufficiently
long periods of time to yield a sufficient base rate of disorder, we will not
be able to distinguish causal from concomitant, confounding, or residual
factors. (Muris & Merckelbach, 2001, p. 375)
Alas, outcomes of such complex prospective studies are hardly available yet.
It is of crucial importance to indicate that, though claim (b) indeed refers to a
relation that can only be corroborated by empirical research, the question which
epistemic criteria the supporting evidence must eventually meet is a normative–
ethical issue. The question really is whether it is 
 
fair
 
 or 
 
just
 
 towards the suspects to
insist on strict epistemic requirements, for example on an empirical corroboration of
the claim at issue. In our view, answering this question indeed requires a different
method or procedure of justification than a purely empirical one; viz. a normative–
ethical method of justification, which is also called the method of ‘reflective
equilibrium’. In this procedure by systematic reflection, our moral intuitions, the
moral principles on which these are based, and relevant background theories
(inclusive of the available scientific theories) are brought into a coherent system
(Daniels, 1996; Elgin, 1996). On the basis of such deliberation we are indeed
inclined to reject strong epistemic criteria. Insisting on strong criteria would imply
that there is insufficient support for claim (b), and consequently an extreme child-
hood could never be a valid reason for exempting a person from being fully
accountable for crimes committed later in life. Such an extreme view conflicts with
our deepest moral intuitions, and therefore we argue for the much more moderate
principle that claim (b) is sufficiently proven if established scientific views and
empirical data make 
 
plausible
 
 that a criminal act is at least partly the result of an
extremely deprived upbringing. For example, in behavioural genetics it is stressed
that children will only develop normally in a species-normal environment, but
not in those lacking ‘average expectable conditions’ under which our species has
evolved (Scarr, 1992). For children and older children these species-normal
environments include protective parenting adults, a supportive family, or a tribe or
group into which the child is socialised. Rearing conditions that fall within the
limits of a normal environment are crucial to 
 
normal
 
 development. The results of
behavioural genetics research and the theoretical notions that are grounded on
these data make it rather plausible that a severely traumatic childhood in relevant
respects promotes an abnormal moral development. According to Bouchard
(1999), current thinking holds that each individual on the basis of her genotype
creates a unique set of experiences, that is, creates her own environment. However,
he also stresses that this view of human development does not deny the existence
of inadequate and debilitating environments.
Our initial educational intuitions and beliefs that grave child abuse and
neglect can result in deficiencies in moral development are also reinforced by
Wallace’s philosophical analyses. Regarding claim (b), Wallace also argues that,
though severe childhood deprivation does not necessarily determine adult wrong-
doing, it is, nevertheless, unfair to treat such a person as fully accountable. For
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extreme and chronic physical and verbal abuse and emotional neglect during the
most formative years most probably will hamper, often to a considerable degree,
the development to a normal level of the powers of reflective self-control. Wallace
assumes that childhood abuse impairs the powers of reflective self-control not by
depriving the adult agent of the ability to grasp and apply moral reasons—as
in psychopathy—but by substantially diminishing the agent’s capacity to control
her behaviour in accordance with such reasons (1994, p. 233). Just like Watson,
he states that a childhood abuse excuse affects our judgements of responsibility
by altering our perception of the motives and abilities of the wrongdoer as an
adult:
they make the adult wrongdoer’s action seem, not inevitable, but
psychologically intelligible. (p. 233)
Claim (c), in which it is stated that the agent was unable to acquire the required
qualities, can partly be elucidated with the help of the notion of ‘undoing the
effects of one’s past’; in this context Fischer & Ravizza (2000) speak about ‘
 
taking
 
responsibility’. Is the agent herself capable of taking responsibility for the mecha-
nism or processes that cause specific immoral acts; can she, metaphorically speak-
ing, ‘defuse’ or ‘deactivate’ them? Clearly in cases like brainwashing or hypnosis
the help or support of another person is needed. However, the incapacity of the
agent to improve her moral capacities herself might indeed be a ‘shadow’ or a
‘trace’ of a traumatic childhood. So the question is: has the agent, despite her
history of abuse, acquired those specific qualities that will enable her to transform
the effects of the abuse into personal considerations and motivations to meet or
undo the lack of moral capacities? Is she capable of transforming her third-person
perspective on her history of abuse into a first-person perspective?
A necessary condition for being able to make such a shift, and this is succinctly
stated by Fischer & Ravizza, is that in her childhood the agent has formed a
disposition to view herself as an apt target for the reactive attitudes. However, the
latter in turn presupposes that in her upbringing the child has been treated 
 
as if
 
she is an appropriate candidate for reactive attitudes and has been invited to take
this ‘internal view’ of herself (2000, pp. 212, 214). This very basic capacity to see
oneself as an apt target for reactive attitudes, and consequently have acquired the
capacity to experience (a certain level of ) moral feelings like shame, guilt and
resentment, possibly forms a condition for being able to morally improve oneself.
An appreciation of this capacity might help us to understand why so many severely
abused or neglected children manage to grow into rather sane and well-adjusted
adults. Overcoming or transforming the effects of a traumatic upbringing often
requires the support of others, be it trained professionals (social workers, counsel-
lors etc.) or sympathetic friends or neighbours. And, clearly, abused or neglected
children that grow up in severely impoverished neighbourhoods often have the bad
luck of being also deprived of opportunities to transform their horrendous past
and, consequently, are perhaps more liable to get caught in the intergenerational
transfer of violence.
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Conclusion
 
Our main question was, can a wretched upbringing or a traumatic youth be a
reason for exempting, be it fully or partially, a person from his criminal behaviour?
In our view it indeed can, provided that a number of conditions are fulfilled. First,
it must be demonstrated that the person lacks a certain configuration of mental
qualities, or in any case that these qualities are developed inadequately. Wallace
indicated the qualities that form the building blocks for the capacity for reflective
self-control, and to this we added, in referring to the example of Harris, the
capacity to have feelings of sympathy. It can be cautiously assumed that both Harris
and Armstead miss one of the indicated qualities, but a valid observation regarding
such qualities requires a diagnostic examination. Second, on the basis of available
corroborated theories and empirical data it must be made plausible that indeed
there are multi-causal relations between the lacking of the mentioned qualities and
the horrendous upbringing. Corroborated theories like the behavioural genetics
theory of the species-normal environment and perhaps the attachment theory
(Bowlby) might very well serve this goal. If these two conditions are met, it can be
assumed that the person in question in any case cannot be held fully accountable
for the committed transgressions. To make a reasonable case that a person is not
even partially accountable, it must be made plausible too that in the past the
person was yet unable to acquire the missing mental qualities. We conjecture that
a person will be unable to do so if, because of her extreme traumatic youth, even
the basic disposition to view herself as an apt target of reactive attitudes has hardly
evolved. To effectively conclude whether the person has or has not acquired this
basic capacity, a valid diagnostic instrument is indeed indispensable.
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